Friend or Foe: Towards a Critical Assessment of Direct Payments by Spandler, Helen
 q H E L E N S P A N D L E R
King’s College, London
Friend or foe? Towards a critical assessment of
direct payments
Abstract
Direct payments enable individuals to purchase their own care rather than
have directly provided services. This article unpacks the complexities
involved in the implementation of direct payments by addressing the need
to reconcile the strong evidence of their benefits with emerging concerns
about the wider consequences of their implementation. One practice that
highlights the conflicts at the heart of direct payments is the employment
of personal assistants. While directly employing personal assistants offers
maximum benefit for recipients, it also produces the strongest concerns.
Therefore, an understanding of the context of direct payments, specifically
the practice of employing personal assistants, is used to explore these
complexities in greater depth. The discussion concludes by arguing for a
more critical awareness of the wider context in which direct payments are
being developed in order to understand how this context can open up or
limit opportunities for greater self-determination. It suggests a number
of factors that need to be addressed to ensure that direct payments
continue to be a progressive strategy. These include reconciling conflicting
ideologies such as those advocating individual choice and/or collective
provision; the need for political action to secure adequate resources; and
the development of alternative strategies such as cooperatives to address
the collective needs of direct payment recipients and workers.
Key words: consumerism, cooperatives, personal assistants, self-
determination, user movement
Introduction
Direct payments (DPs) are paid by a local authority to individuals
who are assessed as requiring community care services and are deemed
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willing to accept and able to manage the payments alone or with
assistance (DoH, 1996). The local authority makes the payments to
the individual (or a user-controlled trust) instead of directly providing
services. The individual then uses the payments to secure the support
or assistance that they feel most appropriately meets their needs.
The key problem this article addresses is how to reconcile the
growing evidence of the benefits that using DPs has brought to
recipients with important concerns about their continued develop-
ment and expansion in social policy. In attempting to answer this
question, I argue that we need to separate out the more progressive
arguments both for and against DPs from more reactionary argu-
ments. I refer to progressive strategies as those that increase the
possibilities of greater self-determination and that address the needs
of recipients and workers. Reactionary arguments against DPs include
fear of change, risk aversion, an over-reliance on traditional and
established ways of working, paternalism, overprotection, institu-
tionalization and professional resistance to giving up control and
power. Reactionary support for DPs might arise from a desire to get
rid of ‘difficult’ clients, cost-cutting and current new right/New
Labour concerns about ‘welfare dependency’. To move beyond a
polarized debate towards a critical assessment of the potential of DPs,
I explore the arguments of proponents and critics of DPs that
primarily arise from ‘progressive’ positions. By doing this, I hope to
contribute towards a critical assessment of DPs as a progressive social
policy initiative.
Background
Any debate about DPs must understand the context of its emergence.
This includes the philosophy of independent living, the social model
of disability and critiques of the medical model. In the UK, the
pressure for DPs arose, in part, via campaigning by organizations of
disabled people. Many independent living centres, offering support to
recipients, have been set up in areas where there has been strong and
effective campaigning by local organizations of disabled people
(Stainton and Boyce, 2002). The notion of self-determination advo-
cated by the independent living movement does not assume that
people could necessarily meet their needs alone, but rather ‘with
assistance’ (Morris, 1997). DPs can enable this assistance, and reci-
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pients frequently use the money to employ their own personal
assistants (PAs); indeed, although people may choose to meet their
needs in a variety of ways, employing and directing PAs has always
been at the heart of demands for DPs (Campbell, 1998; Glasby and
Littlechild, 2002; Zarb and Nadash, 1994).
In principle, if not in practice, giving cash in lieu of services is
‘now officially accepted and endorsed’ (Glendinning et al., 2000c: 11).
However, the slow pace of implementation is frequently seen as a
concern for many user organizations and government (Witcher et al.,
2000). Direct payments are now being increasingly pushed by
government policies (DoH, 2001a, b, 2003). In the UK, until 2002,
local authorities were given ‘discretion’ in implementing DPs, mak-
ing their implementation dependent upon local politics of service
provision (Pearson, 2000). However, new legislation (enforceable from
April 2003) makes it mandatory for local authorities to offer DPs as
an option (DoH, 2001a, 2002).
While legislation has made DPs possible across care groups, take-
up has, until recently, been primarily confined to adults with physical
disabilities. However, their successful implementation has increas-
ingly led to demands that take-up be actively promoted and increased
to other user groups such as elderly people, people with learning
disabilities or mental health needs, carers and younger people
(Bamber, 2002; Evans, 2000; Holman and Bewley, 1999). There are
also increasing demands to extend the provision of DPs into health as
well as social care (Glendinning et al., 2000c).
Finding appropriate terminology for recipients of DPs is difficult.
Despite DPs being available to various client groups, many com-
mentators refer to DP recipients as ‘disabled people’ (see, for example,
Glasby and Littlechild, 2002). This term may be inadequate for other
clients such as those with mental health needs. Other possible terms
include employer, service user, PA user or customer. However, none of
these terms sufficiently captures the complexity of an arrangement
that simultaneously places the ‘service user’ in a position of also being
the purchaser and the possible employer. It is this very complexity
that highlights some of the conflicts at the heart of the development
of DPs. O’Brien (2001) argues that the success of individualized
funding initiatives should be measured by the rate of transition from
consumer to agent; in other words, how far they generate active and
creative negotiators or ‘agents’ rather than simply reproduce passive
consumers. In the absence of a sustained assessment of this transition
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or a corresponding shift in terminology, I use the term ‘recipient’.
This term identifies an individual’s receipt of payments, irrespective of
how they decide to use the money and/or how ‘successful’ it is.
Contextual conflicts
The rise of DPs is also linked to other broader political changes. In
the drive to introduce market forces and managerialism into welfare
services, the new right seized upon people’s dissatisfaction with the
welfare state, particularly its insensitivity to individuals’ needs and
differences, its heavy-handed statism and its bureaucracy (Harris,
1999). In attempts to dismantle the welfare state, the new right
‘skilfully appropriated a diverse set of challenges to state welfare
provision and articulated them around the rhetoric of producer versus
consumer choice’ (1999: 921). This agenda converged with welfare
user movements’ growing concerns and critiques about inadequate
and insensitive services.
Subsequently, New Labour’s focus on community politics and
local ownership has also made concessions to the importance of
market forces in its development of a ‘Third Way’ (Beresford, 2002).
During the 1990s, this ushered in a ‘new consensus’ on the impor-
tance of the individual consumer-citizen which implicitly undermined
any political or collective aspects of social citizenship. DPs highlight
this new consensus as a convergence of the concerns of social justice
and market consumerism (Pearson, 2000).
The history of DPs has therefore comprised a complex confluence
of new right, New Labour and welfare user movement ideologies and
demands. However, because of the diverse ideologies this consensus
has incorporated, tensions and conflicts remain, but are frequently
implicit and uncontested (Pearson, 2000). This confluence has shaped
the development of DPs, in terms of their implementation and
impact, and has resulted in a range of difficulties and conflicts. Most
importantly, these conflicting agendas can actually limit the extent to
which DPs can deliver greater self-determination (Pearson, 2000;
Stainton, 2002). It is precisely assumptions of common interests and
the denial of conflict that cloud the debate about DPs and lead to the
potential benefits of DPs being unrealizable (O’Brien and O’Brien,
1999); indeed, Dowson (2002) argues that it is necessary to clarify
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conflicts of interest in practice rather than pursuing policies that
assume the importance of ‘joint working’ and ‘partnerships’.
Furthermore, these conflicts have led to polarized reactions,
whereby protagonists are either for or against DPs. This atmosphere
has prevented a real assessment of the possibilities and limitations of
DPs. For example, Ungerson (1997) highlights how DPs, and specifi-
cally employing PAs, have been seen by the disability movement as a
panacea and is critical of how DPs are frequently only viewed as
positive. However, it has also been pointed out that critics tend to
overstate their opposition (Glendinning et al., 2000a). For example,
Ungerson describes DPs’ services as ‘goods of limited and contested
utility’ (1997: 51). On the other hand, advocates of DPs (see, for
example, Witcher et al., 2000) argue that any reaction against DPs
can only stem from a fear of change.
Another consequence of the conflicting motivations for DPs is the
potentially conflicting interests of workers and recipients. While
disability activists have tended to advocate DPs, trade unions have
been more cautious. Demands from welfare user movements can at
times appear to conflict with demands from the labour movement,
resulting in what Lewis describes as a ‘welfare trade off’ (Lewis, 1998);
indeed, welfare users’ dissatisfaction with how professionals ignored
their individual needs, rights and choices was one aspect of policy that
the new right exploited during its long reign. More recently, conflict
between workers and users can be illustrated by a high court
judgement that ruled that local authorities cannot enforce a policy
that prohibits care workers from manually lifting clients for health
and safety reasons (Zarb, 2003). This has been viewed as an important
victory for the disability movement, which views using hoists as
disregarding human rights and personal dignity. However, a recent
survey of home care workers reported that 10 percent more of its
members report back pain than the rest of the adult population
(UNISON, 2001).
Proponents of DPs
Grand claims have been made about the benefits of DPs. The
Community Care (Direct Payments) Act (DoH, 1996) has been
described as the realization of 20 years of collective advocacy
(Campbell, 1998). It is hoped that DPs might represent a shift of a
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similar magnitude to that from institutional care to community care.
At the very least, implementing DPs has the capacity to change the
whole focus of community care provision. For those who have yet to
reap the benefits of DPs, such as mental health service users, DPs have
been described as a ‘silent victory’ whose time will come (Maglajlic et
al., 1998: 33). In the field of learning difficulties, DPs have been
described as ‘the single most empowering piece of legislation for
people . . . that has ever been passed onto the statute books’ (Holman,
1999: 3). DPs are viewed as a major step towards a redistribution of
power and resources, providing a way that disabled people can wrest
control of services away from local authorities into their own hands.
DPs offer a ‘unique’ (Glendinning et al., 2000c: 11) and ‘potentially
revolutionary’ (Glasby and Littlechild, 2002: 137) challenge to the
historically unequal relationship between providers and receivers of
care (Campbell, 1998).
For many disabled organizations, DPs are seen as the key to the
expression and realization of the fundamental human right to have the
support necessary to exercise self-determination, choice, independence
and control (Campbell, 1997; Hasler et al., 1999; Morris, 1993).
Stainton (2002) argues that DPs are potentially a major step towards
a structural rights-based model for social work practice. DPs are seen
by many as an important stage in the achievement of a civil rights
movement. Typically, Morris claims that the ‘struggle for direct
payments has been a struggle against segregation’ (1997: 58). In an
impassioned account of its history, Campbell (1998) compares the first
people who demanded DPs with Rosa Parks refusing to give up her
seat to a white man, an act widely seen as kick-starting the black civil
rights movement in the US (Morris, 1997).
Specifically, DPs are viewed as facilitating people to live in the
ways that they choose rather than being given services to match
preconceived assumptions about what is needed and how individuals
should live. DPs provide greater flexibility and reliability over when,
how and who provides the support that people need (Halliwell and
Glendinning, 1998; Stainton and Boyce, 2002). As a consequence,
DPs have the potential of developing more creative and innovative
ways of providing assistance (Torjman, 1996).
These claims are extremely compelling. Furthermore, they seem
to be supported by people’s actual experience of receiving DPs.
Evaluations of DPs report a very high recipient satisfaction rate,
particularly in comparison to conventional services (see, for example,
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Glendinning et al., 2000c; Halliwell and Glendinning, 1998;
Kestenbaum, 1999; Morris, 1993; Stainton and Boyce, 2002; Witcher
et al., 2000; Zarb and Nadash, 1994). The most important aspect of
this satisfaction seems to be the opportunity to exercise choice and
control over support arrangements (Stainton and Boyce, 2002;
Witcher et al., 2000). As a consequence, many recipients report
positive benefits to their quality of health and social life (Glendinning
et al., 2000b). These benefits often derive from increased opportun-
ities for social activities and social support (Glendinning et al.,
2000a). Recipients report enhanced personal autonomy, emotional and
psychological wellbeing, raised opportunities and a greater quality of
life (Carmichael and Brown, 2002; Glendinning et al., 2000a; Stain-
ton and Boyce, 2002; Witcher et al., 2000). Most recipients identify
very few, if any, disadvantages to DPs (see Witcher et al., 2000).
Where recipients do identify problems, these generally relate to
aspects of policy or practice in particular authorities rather than to
DPs per se (Witcher et al., 2000).
Even more revealing is the fact that recipients often speak of their
experience of DPs in emancipatory language (Stainton, 2002). Some
proponents of DPs have speculated that the extension of DPs may
challenge both the inflexible pattern of much traditional service
provision and public prejudice. Growth in recipients’ confidence and
assertion may also lead to demands for increased civil rights and a
greater ability to participate in community and political forums
(Witcher et al., 2000). In addition, benefits have also been noted in
individuals’ social networks, for example by allowing familial and
other relationships to be freed from carer responsibilities (Witcher et
al., 2000).
Another benefit is the more thorny issue of cost savings. The
largest and most influential study of cost effectiveness argues that DPs
are more cost effective than conventional services (Zarb and Nadash,
1994). Services arranged via DPs are almost invariably cheaper than
more traditional forms of service delivery offering equivalent hours of
support. User-controlled money, it is argued, goes further. Powerful
personal incentives exist for recipients to use their money wisely,
efficiently and prudently because their survival and independence
depend upon it (Zarb, 1998). In addition, because the user often acts
as an employer and budget holder, he/she soaks up much of the
administrative and management costs. This may mean that recipients
can get greater levels of social care at no greater cost.
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While the various benefits outlined above suggest that DPs are a
compelling alternative, they have not been developed without criti-
cism. In the following section, I review some of the more important
criticisms that have emerged since their inception.
Critiques of DPs
The lure of possible cost-cutting has resulted in some commentators
being wary of the greater extension of DPs. For example, Canadian
National Union Research expresses concern that the ‘overwhelming
justification for these types of funding schemes appears to be cost-
savings to the system’ (National Union Research, 2000: 6). However,
given the benefits of DPs, opposition merely on the basis of cost-
cutting is inadequate. On the other hand, it is too premature to argue
that ‘all reasonable arguments against it have been demolished . . . it
would be a foolish waste of time to repeat that process’ (Campbell,
1997: 23).
Much of the literature in the UK has focused on ‘reactionary’
concerns about DPs such as fear of change, risk aversion and paternal-
ism. This focus has resulted in recommending strategies to overcome
professional resistance to their implementation. It is frequently repor-
ted that the only difficulties that recipients experience with DPs are
those relating to bureaucracy, paperwork and administration. Such
problems, it is argued, can be solved, or at least eased, by support
services such as independent living centres. While important, this
focus has resulted in little acknowledgement of other more funda-
mental and complex difficulties (Glasby and Littlechild, 2002; Unger-
son, 1997).
This lack of critical analysis and reflection may be partly due to
the relatively recent take-up of DPs in the UK compared with the US
and Canada, where more critiques and debates have emerged (see
National Union Research, 1998, 2000; O’Brien, 1999, 2001). Most
critiques do recognize that, on the whole, DPs are more satisfactory to
recipients (for example, National Union Research, 2000; Ungerson,
1997). However, they remind us that DPs are not necessarily a
straightforward ‘march of progress’ towards the adoption and promo-
tion of progressive social policy.
Critics argue that calls for DPs interrupt important debates about
collective service provision (O’Brien, 2001). In particular, DPs cannot
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replace long-term investment in a solid, publicly-funded and account-
able welfare infrastructure (Torjman, 1996). Ultimately, DPs are
perceived as a threat to a healthy and vibrant public sector that
collectively develops best practices and standards in the provision of
support (National Union Research, 2000). A review of recent social
policies that give public service consumers more ‘choice’ suggests
that, while short-term individual user satisfaction may increase and
general efficiency may improve, wider goals of responsiveness and
experimentation are not so easily achieved (6, 2003).
More specifically, critics have questioned how DPs can contribute
to the evolution of services to meet the needs of groups of individuals
who have similar difficulties (National Union Research, 1998). DPs
do not guarantee the development of new and specialized services, nor
do they necessarily respond in a coherent way to the changing and
dynamic needs of groups and communities rather than just individ-
uals (National Union Research, 1998). O’Brien (2001) questions
whether individualized funding will drive the changes necessary to
develop highly customized services. By developing services one at a
time for individuals who decide to ‘opt out’ of mainstream services,
DPs can become an excuse for avoiding the development work
necessary to make services resourced, flexible and responsive to
individuals’ changing needs (O’Brien and O’Brien, 1999).
DPs may offer alternative ways of providing more culturally
appropriate services by ensuring that people can employ suitable PAs
that understand their specific cultural needs (Begum, 1992; Brown,
1999). This may provide more individualized support and cut across
boundaries such as health/social (Glendinning et al., 2000c) or
gender/culture (Burman et al., 2002) which frequently impede service
accessibility. However, the privatization of care that this necessitates
will not necessarily feed into the development of ‘culturally appro-
priate’ communal services that address the intersections between race,
gender, class, sexuality and disabilities. In addition, it may militate
against an understanding of the wider structural context in which
oppression is experienced. Such understanding may otherwise be
possible through teamworking, sharing information and supervision.
In addition, although research is necessary to investigate the class
background of DP recipients, it may be that more educated, articulate
and primarily middle-class individuals are able to take advantage of
the opportunities offered through DPs.
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Another concern relates to the possible effects of DPs on the
emergence and viability of collective self-help movements. DPs might
circumvent processes of community development and self-help by
removing the possibilities of developing self-help initiatives. The
individual nature of DPs could remove those most likely to initiate
new challenges, especially dissatisfied people with seemingly ‘margin-
alized’ needs who might otherwise be able to voice and address new
collective responses. In addition, although there is some evidence that
DPs facilitate greater social support for individuals, there is still a
concern that DPs are overly individualistic and could invite or
reproduce isolation (Torjman, 1996).
The concern about the underlying individualization of DPs has
emerged particularly in relation to the perceived limits of individual
consumer choice. This suggests that the option of being an individual
paying customer and exercising individual choice is actually illusory
in terms of genuine empowerment. O’Brien argues that, while the
idea of becoming paying customers excites people, the ‘metaphors
that excite enthusiasm’ need careful scrutiny (O’Brien, 2001: 2). The
discourse of consumerism may be seductive particularly because
paying customers hold a more valued role in consumer society than do
beneficiaries of welfare services. Consumers can be seen as providing
the ‘heat that paying customers can apply to unfreeze a system stuck
in controlling people’ (2001: 2). This compelling image of the paying
customer mobilizes many people who are dissatisfied by the current
welfare system’s inability to deliver the assistance that people need.
However, despite the official endorsement of concepts such as choice,
individual budgeting and person centredness, it is questionable
whether this necessarily results in a wider power shift. For example,
O’Brien (1999) argues that despite the growth of individualized
funding schemes, the number of real allies of disabled people among
service managers, politicians and civil servants has actually decreased.
In addition, in the US, ‘consumer choice’ has been used to mask other
reactionary policy agendas such as welfare cuts (Henig, 1994).
This relates to the way that DPs’ proponents have been accused of
misunderstanding how the market works under capitalism because
market forces actually provide a poor impetus for service provision
(National Union Research, 2000; Torjman, 1996). DPs engage the
contradictions of creating an equal market within an underfunded
bureaucratic welfare system (O’Brien, 2001: 6). While powerful
images of individuals choosing their own support from available
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resources might sound compelling, the reality of the market may be
less rewarding. Neoliberal policy analysts and rightwing political
theorists have advocated individualized funding-type policies in many
areas of public policy. However, these have not necessarily been
successful in delivering quality services, social justice or equality – the
principles on which DPs are based. For example, in the education
system, exercising individual ‘choice’ has, in some areas, at least in the
short term, resulted in greater segregation, widening gaps in perform-
ance and the development of an elite subsector (see 6, 2003; Fiske and
Ladd, 2000; Gorard and Taylor, 2002; Noden, 2000).
The ways in which consumerist policies reproduce assumptions
and myths about the market can have important consequences.
Pearson (2000) argues that, while a focus on the market and consum-
erism may have provided the initial motivation for DPs, the extent of
their progressive impact has been restricted in practice by local
authorities’ own market concerns. An emphasis on market discourse
can result in an overdominance of cost-efficiency concerns, resulting in
heavy-handed attempts to ‘account’ for user spending. This sub-
stantially weakens the scope for user control and erodes its ability to
engender stronger notions of social justice (Pearson, 2000).
Moreover, with individuals being increasingly charged for com-
munity care services (Bennett, 1996), the development of DPs could
be seen as a slippery slope to greater privatization and the penetration
of market forces into an already depleted welfare state. Welfare
services may become increasingly based on people’s ability to pay
(National Union Research, 1998). Furthermore, the increasing tight-
ening up of eligibility criteria for community care services, due to
further cuts in welfare provision, will also impact on DPs (Hasler,
1999). Kestenbaum (1999) highlights the way in which many services
that individuals may want to set up via DPs are precisely those that
will be given lower priority because of local authority resource
constraints. Freeing up DPs from the limitations of community care
assessments, eligibility criteria and charging raises questions of equity
– something of which recipients are very aware (Glendinning et al.,
2000c).
More concrete concerns about DPs arise from the specific effects of
the marketization of welfare. These draw attention to poor working
conditions, low pay, safety issues and the lack of consistent, good
quality service providers (National Union Research, 1998, 2000). For
example, Witcher et al. (2000) found a very low rate of pay for some
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PAs and a very wide variation in rates of pay and employment
conditions between local authorities for PAs. These rates were fre-
quently well below those offered by some independent agencies or
social services. In addition, they found that only a minority of local
authorities paid PAs enhanced rates for unsociable hours. Because of
these difficulties, DP recipients experienced problems recruiting PAs
(Carmichael and Brown, 2002; Witcher et al., 2000) and worker
turnover rates could be high, resulting in a lack of continuity
(National Union Research, 2000). These difficulties may have a
disproportionate impact on groups traditionally marginalized in the
workforce by providing cheap labour, such as women (National Union
Research, 1998; Ungerson, 1997; UNISON, 2001) and people from
black and minoritised ethnic communities (Begum, 1992). This
situation reflects a more general trend of devaluing social and home
care work. A survey of home care workers, more than 97 percent of
whom were women, reported receiving depleted pay levels, working
(often unremunerated) unsocial hours and suffering stress, overwork
and health problems (UNISON, 2001).
These specific difficulties concerning the pay and conditions of
PAs relate to a more general political concern about the growth of
unorganized workers and the deregulation of the workforce (National
Union Research, 1998). Some critics argue that the virtual denial of
organizing and collective bargaining rights for workers is one of the
outcomes of DPs and possibly a major motivation for governments
(National Union Research, 2000: 7). This is particularly pertinent
given recent anti-union government policies and continued attacks on
public sector workers. Initiatives such as DPs may be popular
precisely because they have been incorporated as part of a more
general project of destabilizing and weakening the power of the
organized labour movement. For example, a strike by public sector
home care workers in 1996 in Manioba, Canada contributed to an
increased emphasis on individualized funding by the government
(National Union Research, 2000). In the longer term, this may result
in private companies, offering poor working conditions, emerging to
supply the DP market.
In order to explore the benefits and critiques of DPs in more
detail, the following section concentrates on the practice of employing
PAs. This exploration enables a greater consideration of both the
benefits and critiques as well as highlighting some of the specific
problems concerning DPs in practice.
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Conflicts in practice: employing PAs
Although there has been a significant amount of research concerning
DPs, there has been little focus on the views and experiences of PAs.
Their views are important because the complex tasks, roles and
relationships they negotiate play a vital role in delivering the levels of
control and flexibility that recipients require (Glendinning et al.,
2000a). In other words, we must analyse the context within which
support or assistance operates because it is from this very context that
recipients benefit (Glendinning et al., 2000c; Ungerson, 1997). This
section will draw on a study that has researched the perspectives of
PAs (Glendinning et al., 2000c).
Glendinning et al. (2000a) claim that, despite some problems, DP
relationships may actually be mutually beneficial. They found that
PAs themselves often valued being employed directly by users,
particularly because of the increased quality and closeness of relation-
ships. They argued that the direct employment of PAs ‘allowed
relationships to develop which, paradoxically, extended well beyond
conventional employer-employee relationships’ and ‘contained impor-
tant elements of trust, loyalty and affection which were valued by
both parties’ (2000a: 206). They also reported that DP relationships
could bring about a subtle shift of power and make negotiation of
boundaries and responsibilities easier. In addition, while direct service
providers or care agencies tend to ‘cream off’ extra payments for care
arrangements, it may be possible for DP relationships to negotiate a
more generous and egalitarian distribution of money and resources.
While critiques of DPs paint a depressing picture of extreme
conflict between recipients and PAs (see Ungerson, 1997), Glendin-
ning et al. (2000a) document that, in most cases, recipients and PAs
frequently shared similar concerns. These concerns included how poor
working conditions, low rates of pay, low status and poor training and
career opportunities adversely affected the quality of care and relation-
ships provided via DPs. Most recipients, for example, would welcome
higher DP rates so that they could increase PAs’ wages (Glendinning
et al., 2000a; National Union Research, 2000; Zarb and Nadash,
1994). It is therefore not necessarily the attitudes of recipients that
contribute to poor employment conditions, but rather the limitations
of the context in which they are forced to operate.
These shared difficulties could be alleviated by changes to the
ways that DP recipients are supported and the financial arrangements
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and resources that are made available to fund DPs (Glendinning et al.,
2000a). The variety and complexity of tasks undertaken by PAs and
their task of developing new ways of working require a depth of
responsibility and associated stress that should result in greater levels
of pay, supervision and training. This would require such measures as
greater funding; increased and enforceable national rates of pay and
benefits for PAs; greater contingency resources; and a greater recogni-
tion of the unique work of PAs in terms of training, qualifications and
career structures. In addition, it has been argued that standards of care
should be agreed and enforced (National Union Research, 2000).
Transferable and personalized training could be accommodated within
accredited user-led training courses and opportunities provided for
PAs to meet together and organize collectively (Glendinning et al.,
2000a).
However, despite these shared concerns, Glendinning et al.
(2000a) highlight certain aspects of PA work itself that can generate
conflict between recipients and PAs. These difficulties arise from the
close and often complex relationships between PAs and recipients. For
example, some PAs are unsure about their job descriptions and may
feel an overwhelming sense of responsibility and that unreasonable
expectations are placed on them (Glendinning et al., 2000a; National
Union Research, 2000). In addition, while recipients may find it hard
to bring up difficult issues with their PAs, the latter, in turn, may
need opportunities to talk among themselves, but this can conflict
with recipients’ demands for confidentiality (Glendinning et al.,
2000a).
With these broader concerns in mind, alternative ways of provid-
ing DPs have been advocated that involve removing the direct
employer–employee relationship and associated administrative
responsibilities. National Union Research (2000) insists that a dis-
tinction needs to be drawn between self-managed care and the means
by which this can be developed. It argues that self-managed care does
not have to be provided by individualized funding and suggests that
individualized funding is the most common model of providing self-
managed care because it reflects current government priorities, not
necessarily best practice. It argues that the benefits attributed to DPs
are not necessarily dependent upon the need for the recipients to be a
direct employer; indeed, it draws on evidence that users find the
bureaucratic and administrative elements of this difficult. It proposes
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a brokerage or agency model, whereby a third party is responsible for
employment practice, under the control of recipients.
However, as we have seen, one of the most important aspects of
the success of DPs has actually been attributed to the quality of
relationship between recipient and PA precisely because of the direct
employment relationship. Glendinning et al. (2000a) demonstrate
that removing this direct relationship actually removes a large
element of the control that is crucial to improving quality of life and
health via DPs (Glendinning et al., 2000; Stainton and Boyce, 2002;
Witcher et al., 2000). To illustrate this, Glendinning et al. (2000a)
found that such benefits were reduced when agencies provided the
PAs.
A further problem arises because the solutions offered do not
necessarily address the more fundamental problems that DPs them-
selves have evolved to address. Such problems include the historical
and enduring failures, misunderstandings, pathologization and treat-
ment of people with disabilities, learning difficulties and mental
health problems. In particular, they don’t address the enduring and
crucial tension that DPs highlight between users, workers and carers.
For example, if standards of care are agreed and enforced, there may be
less room for the innovative and creative use of DPs that challenge the
ways that usual standards and practices are decided upon. It is, after
all, these very innovations that DPs are designed to initiate and
support. Moreover, the greater the status and training that PAs
receive, the more these potentially threaten the balance of power and
control between the recipient and the PA – exactly what DPs are
designed to redress (Glendinning et al., 2000c). This raises the issue
of how care workers can be trained in ‘user-centred’ ways, a problem
that, more generally, has not been adequately resolved.
More fundamentally, the very changes necessary to enable greater
egalitarian relationships may not be possible within the economic and
political culture in which DPs are currently being promoted; indeed,
one of the reasons that DPs are experienced as better than conven-
tional services is due to the greater level of input and range of tasks
that PAs can perform. Glendinning et al. (2000c) document how
some users receive ‘health-related’ care through their PAs – care that
is no longer available to them on the NHS. However, because
assessments and costings for DPs only include social, domiciliary and
home care, the payment of PAs will continue to reflect this rather
than the more intensive and demanding support that many service
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users actually require. However, this difficulty may be endemic to the
changing nature of home and social care. UNISON (2001) reports
that home care workers in general are being required to take on more
health-related tasks. This situation raises the question of whether DPs
are actually a way out of these difficulties or merely another example
of them.
This section has described how, paradoxically, the employment of
PAs, enabled through DPs, offers both maximum benefit for reci-
pients and yet throws up some of the most difficult and complex
dilemmas. This is mainly due to the close and direct employment
relationship between recipients and PAs. Globally, society is becom-
ing increasingly commodified and marketized and people are recog-
nized primarily as buyers and sellers in an increasingly dehumanized
and alienated marketplace. The exploitation of home and social care
workers in the private sector and the increasingly marginalized,
casualized and low-paid status of home care workers generally has
recently led to UNISON promoting a national Crisis in Social Care
campaign (2002). It seems clear that the extension of DPs must not
compound this situation. More generally, it is not clear how far DPs
can cultivate welfare relationships outside and against the trend of
market capitalism.
Critical recommendations
Having explored some of the complexities involved in the principles
and practices of DPs and specifically the employment of PAs, it seems
clear that neither a simplistic pursuit of DPs as empowerment, nor a
kneejerk reaction against them as merely cost-cutting consumerism is
an adequate response. DPs are not clearly a ‘consumerist’ or a
‘democratic’ approach to social policy (Beresford, 2000), but actually
an example of the convergence of the two, a convergence that yields
both problems and possibilities. While we must take seriously the
obvious benefits that DPs have brought to individuals and to the
culture of welfare, responses must also accentuate the potential
opportunities opened up through DPs and not just reproduce wider
problems in welfare. On the basis of the analysis above, the following
sections suggest some necessary conditions for DPs to continue to be
a progressive strategy.
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a) Individual choice and collective provision
First, it is important to make explicit the tensions and conflicts
articulated through the debates for and against DPs. In particular, it
is necessary to develop a greater understanding of the implications
and interaction between two seemingly conflicting, yet equally pro-
gressive, challenges for social policy. These positions relate to the
primacy of ideologies of individual choice and collective provision.
These two positions can be illustrated by the work of Stainton (2002)
and O’Brien (2001). Stainton argues that the ‘challenge for social
policy is not to find better services, but to create a structure in which
individuals can articulate their claims for the support they need to
equalise their basic capacity to formulate and pursue self determined
plans and purposes’ (2002: 756). Alternatively, O’Brien emphasizes
the necessity of providing the ‘best conditions which will evolve and
develop services that offer highly customized, specialized, publicly
accountable, collective service provision and assistance’ (2001: 2).
The development of social policy must ensure that both these
progressive ideologies are facilitated in policy and practice. This could
be possible through the development of communal resources such as
the collective pooling of DPs (Maglajlic et al., 2000; Ridley and
Jones, 2002; Stainton, 2002). It has been suggested that consumer
cooperatives could be developed that would enable individuals to
combine their DPs to purchase care collectively (Lewis, 2002). The
cooperative would be the employer rather than just the individual
recipient, thus reducing some of the employer–employee conflicts
outlined above, while still enabling the DP recipient to be in control.
Furthermore, pooling resources could enable the development of new
services and community resources. It could also result in the collective
use of contingency monies for members and training and support
opportunities for PAs and recipients.
b) Collective action for resources
In a review of individualized funding schemes in Canada, the US and
Australia, Lord and Hutchinson (2003) report that, where govern-
ments promoted individualized funding without resourcing commu-
nity support networks in the non-profit sectors, it could result in a
highly privatized system that limited the choice and control available
to individuals. In addition, the extent to which recipients are able to
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exercise choice and control through DPs relies heavily on the avail-
ability of workers willing to work in the current context of relatively
poor wages and conditions.
DPs therefore need to be adequately funded, both in terms of the
actual packages, the pay rates available to PAs, as well as the support
structures necessary to enable individuals and their communities to
plan and implement their own support arrangements. Political action,
community campaigning and collective negotiation may be necessary
to entrench adequate levels of funding controlled by service users and
their communities (National Union Research, 1998). Here, the
discourse of consumerism is insufficient because, as O’Brien vividly
describes, ‘it is not as consumers but as political organizers, lobbyists,
participants in civil disobedience, defendants . . . that people with
disabilities and their families influence the level of money available to
the current system’ (2001: 6).
The promotion of DPs into other care groups may encourage and
enable greater connections within and between different service user
groups and social movements such as the disability and mental health
user movement, where desire for greater collaboration has been
thwarted (Beresford, 2000). Such connections could prove invaluable
in the development of stronger and more unified action for greater
resources and input into resource distribution. However, this transi-
tion must take into account the needs of workers in the system.
c) Recipients and PAs
It is necessary to acknowledge and address the complex dynamics and
power relationships between recipients and PAs. The precarious
situation of PAs, who are often isolated, marginalized and low paid,
has been a concern for disability activists advocating DPs (see Ford
and Shaw, 1992). However, this concern has not driven policy. Greater
collaboration between the trade union movement and welfare user
movements may result in developing alternative ways of organizing
PAs if conventional ways are inappropriate. This may entail forms of
occupational collectivity where membership is based not on the
individual employer, but rather on the ‘sense of solidarity developed
through the work they perform’ (National Union Research, 1998: 11).
Informal networks of unorganized workers under DPs might provide
a ‘home base’ for workers who are difficult to organize because of
multiple work sites (National Union Research, 1998). Such initiatives
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could evolve as workers’ cooperatives, but would have to be sensitive
to, and vigilant about, the power dynamics between recipients and
PAs. With these conflicts of interest in mind, Lewis (2002) suggests
the development of ‘multi stakeholder’ cooperatives which would
provide a structure through which DP recipients and PAs could
openly discuss and negotiate key interests and could develop a
powerful advocacy function, decrease individualization and maximize
the pressure for adequate resources.
d) Critical analysis
The practice of DPs has disrupted traditional divisions between left
and right political discourses and questioned many widely held
assumptions and values about welfare provision. The resulting confu-
sion demands a more critical understanding of the changing political
context in which DPs are being implemented as well as more complex
responses to their expansion. Finally, therefore, it is necessary to
develop a critical understanding of the dominant political landscape
in which DP schemes are being implemented and the ways this can
open up – and close down – opportunities for the development of
greater strategies for self-determination.
DPs exist within a constraining political culture which ultimately
limits the extent to which they might be able to provide the wider
benefits advocated by their proponents. Therefore, the extent of their
progressiveness may ultimately depend not only on local implementa-
tion strategies, but also on these wider forces and, more importantly,
how these forces are collectively negotiated, influenced and chal-
lenged. Although many of the tensions and contradictions discussed
in this article have always been present in welfare services, DPs bring
these into sharper focus. Careful consideration of the ways forward and
sustained critique are necessary if DPs are really to function as ‘one
means to re-shape our world’ (O’Brien, 2001: 15).
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